In Colt International v Tarmac Construction Ltd (1996) CILL 1145, it was held that legal representatives have an obligation to assist arbitrators; they may not observe him flounder in unfamiliar territory and then apply to the court alleging that he has proceeded irregularly. However, not all parties will choose legal assistance and even where they do, the efficient conduct of a reference may require the provision to the arbitrator of more consistent, thoroughgoing and independent assistance than may be available from the parties' representatives. Arbitrations can be complex, involving difficult questions of fact, substantive law and procedural law. The availability to the arbitrator of legal assistance may reduce the incidence of legally erroneous awards and, similarly, technical assistance may reduce technically or factually erroneous awards.
The concept of an arbitrator obtaining independent legal advice is not new. Indeed, historically, the judges would sometimes, with the consent of the parties, leave technical matters, especially the taking of account, to a referee (see Mustill and Boyd, 2nd ed, at p. 44 In the event, the application failed.
However the arbitrator's difficulties in that case would not have arisen if he had had an unequivocal power to obtain independent legal advice. Without that power it can be open to a party to drive the arbitrator towards an inefficient procedure or an award which fails to reflect the true merits.
A potential problem with that view is that the parties have agreed that a specific individual or individuals should decide their dispute, or at least agreed or assented to the mechanism for the tribunal's appointment; and it runs contrary to that agreement for the arbitrator to subcontract his personal 
RISK OF SUBCONTRACTING
However it is suggested that, in practice, the risk of the arbitrator subcontracting his responsibilities is slight, for the following reasons:
(1) The appointed arbitrator faces the parties at preliminary meetings and at the main hearing, so except where the dispute does not require such processes, it is likely to become apparent to the parties if the arbitrator is adopting a position which he does not in truth understand and support; rather than a wholly independent source of assistance. As such it is suggested that this mechanism should only be operated if both parties agree.
The relationship of the arbitrator and the parties is a personal one and a participating assessor intrudes upon it.
He is also more likely, because of his deeper involvement in the arbitral process, to influence the arbitrator in decision-making. It follows that the appointee should be nominated or at least approved by the parties, rather than being selected entirely at the discretion of the arbitrator. As in the earlier scheme, the arbitrator relies on the expert to the extent he considers appropriate and he retains responsibility for each decision. Therefore it also follows that the arbitrator must also agree to the procedure: to oblige the arbitrator to accept an adviser where he considers it inappropriate and does not intend to take notice of his advice would achieve nothing.
EFFICIENT USE OF ADVISER
The use of a participating adviser is likely to he particularly efficient where a lay arbitrator is appointed to decide the dispute because of his highly specialised technical understanding, but the disposal of the issues requires equally specialised legal analysis or, in particular, a highly developed understanding of procedure.
Thus such an assessor could assist the arbitrator in deciding whether to order particulars of case or statements of case, or explain to him the factors legitimately to be taken into account on an application for security for costs. Yet with a commitment fee of £67,750.)
Because the adviser's appointment can be made at any time after the commencement of the reference, he can be selected according to the known requirements of the case.
APPROVAL BY THE PARTIES
The relationship of the arbitrator and the parties is a personal one and a participating assessor intrudes upon it. He is also more likely, because of his deeper involvement in the arbitral process, to influence the arbitrator in decision-making. It follows that the appointee should be nominated or at least approved by the parties, rather than being selected entirely at the discretion of the arbitrator.
The disadvantage is that where such an appointment seems desirable, one or other party may withhold consent for strategic reasons. However, as observed above, it is necessary that such an appointment should be consensual.
Nevertheless, in cases of substance and complexity where an appointment is more likely to be efficient, each party, or his representative, may perceive a mutual advantage in proceeding in this manner, knowing that even if they withhold consent, the arbitrator \\ill nevertheless be able to obtain advice privately under the first method set out above.
Operating method
It is suggested that the costs incurred oo in operating either method would be a proper cost of the reference.
Both methods are broadly enacted by s. 37 of the f996 Act. However, on the basis of the above analysis, it is suggested that an amendment of the Act is desirable so that:
(1)Subsection 37 (1) To enable an assessor to make decisions is to confer on him an arbitrator's role. To allow him to make decisions without appointing him arbitrator would be to cause confusion as to where the arbitrator's role ended and the assessor's began, and the enforceability of awards could be called into question.
CONCLUSION
In many respects the task of the arbitrator is more exacting than that of the High Court judge. Whereas the judge is entitled and obliged to follow the welltrodden paths of the White Book, the arbitrator (subject to the contrary agreement of the parties) has an extremely wide discretion as to procedure, and must exercise that discretion so as to minimise the time and cost of the reference without doing damage to the fairness of the award; and Such difficulties may be mitigated by the introduction of a greater entitlement on the part of the arbitrator to have recourse to specialist assistance, and it is suggested that the 1996 Act, while partlv
